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After the collapse of the bubble economy, the “production committee model” of film 
production, which involved joint investment by multiple companies, became dominant 
in Japanese commercial films. In this model, television networks, which led the com-
mittee, came together with publishers and film software companies, in addition to film 
companies that are in charge of distributing films, in order to disperse risk and plan 
secondary sales of television programs, DVDs, and books. As with their American 
counterparts, Japan film studios had previously used their own staff and cast to pro-
duce films independently and then distribute them to theaters for profit. However, this 
practice has completely disappeared, and now film companies work together with out-
side companies to create films. The studios also functioned as educational institutions 
to train the next generation of filmmakers, a role now performed by universities. I 
myself was involved in such a project, participating as a director’s assistant in the pro-
duction of a dramatic film called Miroku, with both professional filmmakers and col-
lege students. The actor Masatoshi Nagase, who had played the Japanese protagonist 
in Jim Jarmusch’s Mystery Train （1989）, starred in the film. Some college students go 
from working with first-rate filmmakers in situations like this to later working in the 
film industry themselves. In any case, the decline of the studio system changed the 
education system for those working in filmmaking as well as film production practices 
themselves. A major part of the change came in the 1980s, during the economic bub-
ble period. As the studio system declined, it was supplanted by a system of participa-
tion by various external companies in the film production business. In this 
presentation, I consider the collapse of the studio system as it propelled other busi-
nesses to participate in movie production and led to the present state of the movie in-
dustry. Below, after discussing the studio system at the height of its prosperity, I will 
cover the chain of events that led to its downfall.
　　First, I will examine the Japanese film industry of the 1950s, when studios func-
tioned most successfully. In keeping with Japan’s postwar recovery, the number of 
moviegoers rapidly increased each year. At the peak, each person in Japan went to 
the movies at least once a month, theoretically speaking, and movies became deeply 
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entrenched in people’s lives. 1 Starting with the Venice Film Festival’s Grand Prix’s 
being awarded to Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon in 1951, Japanese films began to draw 
international attention, with Kenji Mizoguchi’s The Life of Oharu, Ugetsu, and Sansho 
the Bailiff also winning awards consecutively from 1952 to 1954 at the festival. Taking 
advantage of this trend, the six major studios, Nikkatsu, Tōhō, Tōei, Shōchiku, Daiei, 
and Shintōhō, released new films every week. Each had its own directors and actors 
who were bound by contract and could not work for other studios. With these pre-es-
tablished teams, studios could thus produce a high volume of similar films. It is rela-
tively easy to break down the studios into a list according to genre: Nikkatsu was 
known for action films; Tōhō for films using special effects, particularly monster films 
like Godzilla, as well as comedies; Tōei for historical dramas and matatabi （ruffian and 
Yakuza） films; Shōchiku for melodrama films and family dramas; and Daiei for popu-
larizing haha-mono （films about the lives and suffering of mothers） soon after the war 
and also for historical dramas in the 1960s. Even Shintōhō, which went bankrupt in 
1961, managed to make a name for itself in erotic and grotesque films. Having a fixed 
staff and cast functioned very efficiently in terms of mass producing the films of each 
studio’s type and led to each studio’s having one specialty genre. In this era, quantity 
was increasingly valued over quality.
　　Tōei, founded in 1951 and an emerging company at the time, tried using its own 
films in double feature programs and began distributing new double feature films in 
1954. For theaters as well, making a contract with a single studio was cheaper and 
more convenient than contracting with multiple studios and putting together double 
features on their own. Therefore, by the end of December 1953, there were 42 
Toei-exclusive theaters, and a little more than half a year after, they had begun pro-
ducing double features, that is, by the end of August 1954, there were 155 such the-
aters, a nearly four-fold expansion. 2 The other major studios certainly did not simply 
observe Tōei’s strategy. With the exception of Shintōhō, which was no longer able to 
produce films, beginning in January 1956, Shōchiku, Daiei, Tōhō, and Nikkatsu also 
began to increase production. 3 Although at some instances only one new film a week 
1 　If the number of movie visitors published in “Statistics of Film Industry in Japan” on the Mo-
tion Picture Producers Association of Japan website （http://www.eiren.org/toukei/data.
html） was divided by 90 million, which was the total population of Japan at the time, people 
would have gone to the movies 12 or more times per year on average between 1957 and 
1959. 
2 　‘Nihondate kyōsō to nihon eiga no sinyō,’ Kinema junpō, November 1, 1958, p. 65.
3 　Since it was difficult to maintain the production of double features, all the studios eventually 
reduced production. However, they resumed the production of new double features in 1958.
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or the same film was shown for two weeks straight, each studio basically released two 
new films per week in order to obtain more theaters with exclusive contracts.
　　Thus, we can see that behind this substantive competition in new double feature 
films was each studio’s plans to improve its own distribution and standing at the box 
office. The major Hollywood studios from the 1930s and 1940s glorified their status as 
an oligopoly; distribution strength in major cities and industry-wide networks led to 
monopolistic control （major studios in 1945 controlled more than 70% of premiere the-
aters）. 4 However, the Supreme Court ruled in 1948 to end the practice known as 
“block booking” in which production and distribution companies made contracts to sell 
groups of films as one block （United States v. Paramount Pictures）. This dealt a major 
blow to studios and was a major reason for the decline of the studio system, along 
with people’s moving to the suburbs and the spread of television. 5 In Japan as well, in 
the post-war period, there were efforts to prohibit major film studios’ control of the in-
dustry. By 1955, the Japan Fair Trade Commission had found violations under the 
“Antimonopoly Act” ［Dokusen kinshihō］ and Excessive Economic Power Deconcentra-
tion Law ［Kado keizairyoku shūchū haijo hō］ four times including re-examinations, 
and film studios promised to make improvements. However, they ultimately did not 
follow through, and without any legal action to deal with the situation, the studios’ 
control through block booking grew even stronger. 6 In other words, the studio sys-
tem’s safe functioning depended on control through block booking, which guaranteed 
that the films they produced would have a stable distribution into the market.
　　Next, I will move on to the discussion of the 1960s, when Japan’s studio system 
fell into a state of crisis. In this period, there were obstructions to film studios’ control 
through block booking. In 1958, the number of movie spectators was 1．12 billion, but 
this turned out to be the last year of growth, and five years later, in 1963, the number 
had sharply dropped to less than half, at 510 million. The television, which began 
broadcasting programs in 1953 and rapidly permeated society, was seen as a problem, 
and indeed, the spread of television and the contrastive decline in movie theater atten-
dance began to be noticeable.
　　Studios were faced with a grim situation as people stopped going to the movies, 
4 　Douglas Gomery, The Hollywood Studio System （New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986）, pp. 8―
13.
5 　Douglas Gomery and Clara Pafort-Overduin, Movie History: A Survey, 2 nd ed （New York: 
Routledge, 2011）, pp. 162.
6 　Katō Atusko, ‘Eiga kaisha no shijō ninshiki to kankyaku: 1930-1960 nendai o chūshin ni,’ in 
Fujiki Hideaki （ed.） Kankyaku eno apurōchi （Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2011）, p. 102.
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and each drastically reduced the number of films it produced. For example, Tōei had 
distributed more than 100 films per year in the 1950s, but this dropped below 100 in 
1961 and declined drastically to 40 in 1965. Other studios had similar decreases, each 
ending up with around 50 distributed in 1965 （only Nikkatsu distributed more, at 65 
films）. The practice of releasing new double features every week completely disap-
peared. 7 As they produced fewer films, it was inevitable that these studios would 
have to scale down.
　　Japanese film studios stopped signing exclusive contracts with staff and cast 
members and tried reducing personnel. Shōchiku closed its Kyoto studio in 1965, thus 
putting excess personnel on standby at their homes, while Daiei took similar measures 
out of necessity to reduce its workforce. Nikkatsu decided to create its own films for 
television in order to employ those who no longer had any work, having previously 
dispatched directors and actors to subcontracted companies for this purpose. Now 
they devoted one stage of their studio to films for television and switched to producing 
their own. 8 These types of measures occurred at each studio in the name of rational-
ization, but one could also see it as their paying the debt for the blind mass production 
of movies in the more prosperous 1950s.
　　These changes to major film studios also gave more space to independent produc-
tions, which had previously been hidden in their shadow. Without a distribution net-
work like the major studios, these independent studios had, until then, rarely been 
able to reach a national market. However, reduced production by major studios meant 
that independent work could receive more attention. Film studios began to purchase 
independently-made films and distribute them through their own channels. Shōchiku, 
in particular, having mainly produced melodramas and family drama films, lost much 
ground to television dramas and began to reconsider their production of movies. In a 
sense freeing themselves from the conventions of their own genre, they began to ac-
tively distribute externally produced films dealing with erotic or other themes outside 
of family drama. In 1967, one-third of the films they distributed were not produced in-
house. 9 This applied not only to Shochiku; making space for the distribution of inde-
pendent films in order to maintain a strong distribution network grew more common 
at other major film studios as well.
　　Lastly, I aim to summarize the ideas I have presented. The collapse of the studio 
7 　‘Tōkei hen,’ Eiga nenkan 1967 nen ban （Tokyo: Jiji tsūshin sha, 1967）, p. 49.
8 　‘Nikkatsu ōsōji no toshi,’ Ibid pp. 126―127.
9 　‘Daiei no saiken to akaji mondai,’ Gōdō tsūshin tokushin ban, August 27, 1967, p. 1 .
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system, which led to the participation in film production of various companies from 
other industries, began in the 1960s with disruptions to “block booking,” which was 
closely linked to production, distribution, and screening. Major film studios ceased the 
mass production approach of the more prosperous 1950s, shifting to a focus on distri-
bution and screening in the less prosperous 1960s. They began to also distribute out-
side films even if those films did not fit their established image. Through this, the 
major studios tried to maintain control of distribution and screening.
　　In 1969, the television networks that play a central role in present-day production 
committees became involved in filmmaking （Fuji Television joined with Tōhō to cre-
ate Goyōkin）. If the studio system had remained stable and continued, the film indus-
try would not have had to accept capital support from the television industry, which 
had a certain influence on the decline of the film industry. The opening that would 
allow companies from outside industries to join in film production was already present 
in the 1960s.
